INTRODUCTION
[T]he liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water.'
For the past ten years, 2 the Ohio General Assembly has struggled to pass a living will statute. Legislators have introduced bills in both the Senate and the House of Representatives during each of the last five sessions.' Unfortunately, none of these bills has become law, and Ohio's part-time legislators 4 will try again to enact a living will statute during the 119th General Assembly. The 132 legislators 5 are valiantly attempting to pass such a bill during this General Assembly. Rep. Guthrie 6 introduced H.B. 70 in the House of Representatives during this term. Sen. Montgomery' introduced S.B. 1 in the Ohio Senate. On February 5, 1991, this bill successfully passed in the Senate with a vote of 28 to 5. S.B. 1 was referred to the House of Representatives on February 7, 1991. 'Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 , 2857 (1990 (O'Connor, J., concurring) . 2 The first living will legislation was introduced in the Ohio Legislature in 1981. 3 The following bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives:
114th General Assembly, 1981 -82, H.B. 137, Rep. Nettle 115th General Assembly, 1983 -84, H.B. 331, Rep. Nettle 116th General Assembly, 1985 -86, H.B. 220, Rep. Nettle 117th General Assembly, 1987 -88, II.B. 896, Rep. Guthrie 118th General Assembly, 1989 The following bills have been introduced in the Senate:
116th General Assembly, 1985 -86, S.B. 72, Sen. Snyder 117th General Assembly, 1987 -88, S.B. 148, Sen. Nettle 118th General Assembly, 1989 , Sen Nettle S.B. 380, Sen. Zimmers S.B. 383, Sen. Hobson 4 Each General Assembly lasts for two years--from January of one year through December of the next. The legislators usually begin their session on the first Monday after the first Tuesday in January, and meet on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of scheduled weeks. (Telephone interview with the Legislative Information Office (January 28, 1991) . 'There are 99 State Representatives and 33 State Senators in the Ohio Legislature. 6 Representative Marc Guthrie, one of the major proponents of living wills, was elected to the Ohio The purpose of this Comment is to review S.B. 1 and to compare it to other states living will statutes and to the proposed Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act. 8 Part I briefly overviews the American history of living wills. Part II reviews living will/rightto die statutes in effect and major court decisions. Part III discusses Ohio's position on the right to die, both statutory and judicial. Part IV reviews S.B. 1 and suggests several changes. The conclusion recommends that a uniform living will statute be enacted to guarantee equal treatment for patients in all jurisdictions.
PART I: BRIEF OvERViEw OF LIVING WILLs

State Legislation
California passed the first living will statute in 1976. 9 The term "living will" was first used by Luis Kutner in 1969.10 It denotes a document in which a person can make advance directives concerning the use ornon-use of life support systems." In contrast, a durable power of attorney 12 is a document in which one person (referred to as "principal") appoints anamed individual (referred to as "agent") to make health care decisions for him if he becomes incompetent. ' 3 Living will statutes were originally enacted 4 to permit persons in a persistent of health care proxies or surrogates." 8 Over half the states have enacted both living will and durable powerof attorney forhealth care statutes. 1 9 Nine states have enacted only durable power of attorney for health care statutes. 20 Only Nebraska has failed to enact a living will or durable power of attorney for health care statute.
Federal Legislation
The federal government now has attempted to insure a patient's right to die. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 was passed on November 6, 1990.22 Title IV (Medicare, Medicaid, and Other Health-Related Programs) contains section 4206 which solidifies a patient's right to make health care decisions. 23 This section has been called the Federal Patient's Self-Determination Act. It amends 42 U.S.C. sections 1395cc(a)(1) and 1866(a)(1) by directing that all hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, hospice programs, prepaid health organizations, and providers of service must:
(A) provide written information to each such individual concerning--(i) an individual's right under State law (whether statutory or as recognized by the courts of the State) to make decisions concerning such medical care, including the right to accept or refuse medical or surgical treatment and the right to formulate advance directives .... (3) In this subsection, the term "advance directive"means a written instruction, such as a living will or durable power of attorney for health care, recognized under State law (whether statutory or as recognized by the courts of the State) and relating to the provision of such care when the individual is incapacitated.
In view of this new legislation, it appears that most patients (with the possible exception of those in Nebraska, which does not have a statute in place) will be informed of their rights to make advance medical care decisions. Although this is an excellent first step, it will not eradicate the problem of patients being treated differently in each state.
PART II: STATE STATUES
Although no two statutes are identical, all statutes address similar aspects.
24
Every state requires the document to be executed with some formality. 2 1 All statutes require the declarant 26 to sign the document (or to authorize someone to sign in his stead). 27 At least two witnesses are required in every state; however, each state -H.R. 5835, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990) (effective December 1, 1991) .
23Id.
I For an in-depth analysis of individual state statutes, see Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The FirstDecade, 1987 Wis. L. RL.. 737-822 (Sept-Oct 1987) . 25 See supra note 17. m"Declarant" has been defined as "a mentally competent adult who executes a declaration" or a person "who has executed a living will". See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 15-18-103(4) (1990) and GA. CODE imposes different qualifications for these witnesses. 28 Some jurisdictions do not restrict the "identity" of qualified witnesses. 29 While some jurisdictions only restrict age," others use blood or marital relationship, financial relationship or doctor/ patient relationship as the criteria. 3 ' Several states also require the signatures to be notarized. 32 Every state grants immunity to doctors, nurses, or facilities which honor the declarant's written request. 3 3 Every state also requires the declarant to notify the health care providers of his decision.' Further, every state allows the declarant to revoke the document. 35 Finally, every state indicates that observation of the patient's directives will not be considered suicide or euthanasia.
36
The states treat several aspects differently. These differences form the basis of the problem propounded in this comment; that is, based upon the differences among statutes, patients are treated dissimilarly. Perhaps the new federal legislation will be the first step in passing a uniform living will statute. The major differences among the state statutes are discussed below. 
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Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 8 http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8 This clause, in particular, raises a very important constitutional issue. Since a woman has a right to have an abortion during the first trimester, 43 can a state protect that fetus when the mother has declared that she not be kept alive by artificial means? Does a terminally ill, yet competent, woman have the right to obtain an abortion so that her living will can be honored? Courts must answer these questions as they decide future cases.
Penalty for Physician's Failure to Follow Patient's Directive
Most states do not penalize a physician or health care facility for disregarding a patient's directive to withhold or withdraw medical treatment. 44 Several states provide that the physician is guilty of only unprofessional conduct. 45 Two states subject the physician to disciplinary sanctions." Three states may subject the physician to criminal penalties. 47 Alaska's penalty is unique.4 The Alaska statute directs that the attending physician who disregards the patient's directive has no right to compensation for unwanted medical services and that the doctor may be liable to the patient or his heirs for up to a $1,000 civil penalty.
49
If the doctor or health care provider is not punished for ignoring the patient's directive, then there will be no incentive to follow the patient's wishes. Although each state requires the doctor to transfer the patient to another facility if he will not allow a patient to die, the doctor may transfer the patient only under the threat of a penalty. If the statute imposes sanctions against recalcitrant doctors, the legislature will be sending a strong message to doctors that patients are entitled to make these decisions.
Withholding or Withdrawing Hydration and Nutrition
Most states do not address specifically whether hydration and nutrition can be withheld or withdrawn from a patient who has executed a living will. 0 Several statutes direct that nutrition and hydration are not "life prolonging procedures," but, rather, are necessary for comfort care. 5 ' Three states permit nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn or withheld if the patient will not die of starvation or dehydration. AKRON LAW R~I VwL [Vol. 24:3 & 4 In Alaska, 3 Maine, s ' and Minnesota 5 the patient can direct that nutrition and hydration be withheld or withdrawn. Two states allow nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn or withheld if it is not necessary to relieve pain or provide comfort care, or if it could not be physically assimilated. 5 6 Colorado allows allow nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn or withheld if it is the patient's only treatment. 57 However, the physician can override this directive if, in his opinion, the nutrition and hydration are necessary to relieve pain. 5 Again, this is an important restriction of the patient's right to die. The conflict among statutes means that a patient in a PVS in one state can be allowed to die, whereas a similarly-situated patient in another state can be forced to endure artificial nutrition and hydration for years. Even if both patients had executed identical living will documents, one state would honor her wishes, while the otherstate would ignore them. All states should protect a fundamental right Citizens should not be required to examine the differences among state statutes as they choose in which state to reside. Their wishes should be honored in every jurisdiction throughout the United States. A uniform living will statute would alleviate this problem.
COURT DEctsIONs
In addition to the various statutes, courts have decided many cases based upon the common law and constitution. 9 This section will briefly overview these major cases.
Right to Privacy/Right to Die
In Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 60 the United States Supreme Court recognized an individual's right to privacy when it held: "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others .... -61 The Supreme Court also recognized the rightto privacy -1 ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c) (1990).
-ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701(4)(A) (1990). -"Mw. STAT. § 145D.03(b)(1) (1990).
6
MoNr. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(2) (1989) This right was further expanded in Griswold v. Connecticut" where Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found that there is a constitutional right to privacy that can be found in the penumbra of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. 6 " In Roe v. Wade,"6 the Court found that the "right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whetherornot to terminate pregnancy.1 67 However, the Court acknowledged that privacy rights are not absolute. Therefore, privacy rights may yield to a state's "compelling" interests. 68 The Roe Court held that the state cannot interfere during the first trimester, that the state may regulate to protect maternal health during the second trimester, and that the state may prohibit the abortion during the third trimester.
69
The states have extended this fundamental right to privacy (now also interpreted as the right to "bodily integrity") to right to die cases. In In re Conroy, 0 the 84-year old patient suffered from severe organic brain syndrome and several other ailments. 7 ' She totally depended upon a nasogastric tube for nutrition and hydration. 72 The court held that "[tihe right to make certain decisions concerning one's body is also protected by the federal constitutional right of privacy. 
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Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 8 http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8 Spring, 1991] November 1985, three years after being diagnosed with ALS and two years after undergoing a tracheotomy and being connected to a respirator, Kathleen told her husband she wanted to be disconnected from the machine.1 6 The husband petitioned the court for permission to disconnect the machine." The trial court granted his request.
78 Kathleen died while her guardian's appeal was pending. 79 The court reaffirmed the "well-recognized common-law right of self-determination that '[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body .... "', 80 The court then established the following guidelines to follow when a competent patient living at home requests the discontinuance of life-support systems: (1) the patient must be deemed to be competent, (2) the patient must be deemed to have voluntarily made his choice without coercion, and (3) the patient's right to choose must be balanced against the four countervailing state interests: preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting third persons. 81 The courtheld that "[a] competent person's interest in her or his self-determination generally outweighs any countervailing interest the state might have.
82
In Lane v. Candura 8 3 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts allowed a 77-year old patient to refuse to have her leg amputated, even though the operation probably wouldhave savedherlife. 84 The court stated that" [t] he law protects herright to make her own decision to accept or reject treatment, whether that decision is wise or unwise." 85 The court further determined that " [a] person is presumed to be competent unless shown by the evidence not to be competent."
86
Abe Perlmutter, 73-years old, also suffered from Lou Gehrig's disease. 8 7 The trial court granted his request to have the respirator removed. 8 8 The district court affirmed that decision. 89 The court determined that since the patient is entitled to initially refuse treatment, that patient is also entitled to discontinue treatment when he so chooses. 90 The court concluded that:
It is all very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so that there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914 no possible trespass on medical ethics. However, it is quite another matter to do so at the patient's sole expense and against his competent will, thus inflicting never ending physical torture on his body until the inevitable, but artificially suspended, moment of death. Such a course of conduct invades the basic constitutional right of privacy, removes his freedom of choice and invades his right to self-determine. 9 '
Incompetent Patients 92
The most well-known decisions are those in which the families of artificiallysustained incompetent patients have petitioned the courts to remove the lifesustaining procedures. These are the cases which made the headlines and brought this issue before the American public.
In the seminal case of In re Quinlan, 93 Karen Ann Quinlan, 22-years old, lapsed into a PVS for reasons unclear.Y The trial court refused to permit Karen's father to withdraw the life support system. 95 However, the New Jersey Supreme Court immediately modified and remanded the case. It ordered the trial court to appoint Karen's father her guardian and to grant him full power to make Karen's health care decisions. 96 The court relied upon the doctrine of substituted judgment, stating "[tihe only practical way to prevent destruction of the right [to privacy] is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment... as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances." 9 The Court also noted, "[tlhe State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately, there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State's interest." 98 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also applied the substituted judgment doctrine to determine whether medical treatment could be withheld from a 67-year-old severely retarded patient with leukemia. 99 The court weighed the patient's wishes against the following state interests:
(1) the preservation of life; [Vol. 24: 3 & 4 (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession." 0°T he court held that "the decision in cases such as this should be that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the competent person."
10 '
The only right to die case to come before the United States Supreme Court is A IME To LIVE
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The dicta in Cruzan has been widely interpreted to mean that apatient's wishes will be followed if a living will is executed or, in the alternative, that a duly appointed surrogate can make these decisions on behalf of the patient." 4 Unfortunately, the majority holding only concerns the standard of proof a state can require and whether the state has to adopt the substituted judgment of the patient's family. The Court did not determine that a patient who has not executed a prior directive automatically has a constitutional right to die.
Since the Cruzan Court failed to face the right to die issue head-on, the courts of the various jurisdictions will continue to establish their own criteria. A uniform living will statute would promote uniformity and certainty and would preserve to all patients the fundamental right to decide.
PART III: Omio's TR.EATmENT
Thus far, the State of Ohio has failed to pass a living will statute" 5 and to thereby extend the fundamental right to make medical decisions to its citizens. Ohio's lower courts have decided three major right to die cases. " 6 However, to date, the Ohio Supreme Court has not addressed the issue.
Court Decisions
Ohio's first right to die case was Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, (Leach I)."' The Court of Common Pleas of Summit County considered whether a 70 yearold ALS patient's life support system could be terminated.'
Edna Leach was diagnosed with ALS on June 11, 1980." 9 She entered the hospital on July 27, 1980.12° On July 29, 1980 Edna suffered cardiac arrest, was resuscitated, was and placed on life support systems.' 2 ' Edna's husband requested that the support system be terminated. 2 2 On October 13, 1980, her doctor attested that her condition was "hopeless" and that "her ultimate demise [was] only a matter of time.' 2 3 However, the doctor insisted that the life support could only be terminated by court order.
24
A legal guardian was appointed, and a hearing was held. 25 Seventeen witnesses recalled conversations that they had with Edna prior to her illness. 26 Three doctors 
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Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 8 http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8 33 The court further held that clear and convincing proof was required.'13 The court allowed the respirator to be disconnected only if certain conditions were met:
(1) two doctors must examine Edna and certify that she continued to be in a permanent vegetative state;
(2) the Summit County Coroner and Prosecutor must receive 48 hours' notice of the examination and could have a witness present; (3) after the examination, there was to be a 48 hour waiting period before the act of discontinuance and the Coroner and Prosecutor could have a witness present.
35
The second Ohio case was Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, (Leach 11).136 Edna's respirator was disconnected on January 6, 1981, and she died. 37 In July, 1982, Edna's heirs filed an action for damages for the time that Edna was forced to endure the life support system. 38 The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. 3 9 The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for the following reasons:
(1) Plaintiffs did state a cause of action in their complaint, and the motion for summary judgment was improperly granted. 139Id.
Shields-Stiefel: A Time To Live
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991 (2) A physician who treats a patient without consent commits a battery and the patient may recover for battery if his refusal is ignored.
(3) There is a requirement of informed consentby which the doctorhas a duty to obtain the patient's informed consent to any medical treatment.
(4) Where the patient is not competent to consent, an authorized person may consent in the patient's behalf.
(5) Until such time as the legislature provides more efficient means of protecting the rights of patients, there must be judicial approval before a life support system can be withdrawn, and Plaintiff may not recover for ordinary medical expenses incurred during the time reasonably required to obtain court permission.
(6) The doctors should have received consent from someone acting on the patient's behalf before placing her on the life support system unless it was an emergency.
(7) There were genuine issues of fact, and the complaint should not have been dismissed.1 4 0
The Ohio Court of Appeals has decided only one case since Ohio's Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act was enacted.14 1 David Couture was 29 years old when he lapsed into PVS in reaction to medication he had taken. 142 Daniel's mother was originally appointed his guardian. 4 1 She asked Daniel's caretakers to withdraw his artificial nutrition and hydration. 1 " Daniel's father opposed the request.1 4 1 However, after a hearing on June 26, 1989, the probate court allowed the guardian to make any future treatment decisions.' 46 Daniel's father appealed the decision. 47 The probate court granted a temporary restraining order from which the hospital appealed.' 48 Finally, on August 2, 1989, Daniel's mother voluntarily withdrew as guardian. 49 His father was appointed in her stead. 5 ' Daniel's life I'°Jd. at 394-95, 469 N.E.2d 1051-1054 (1984) . [Vol. 24:3 & 4
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A IME To LIv 715 expectancy was only one to two months at the time of the June 26 hearing.' 5 '
The court held that nutrition and hydration could not be withdrawn from a patient.1 52 It based its decision solely upon the Durable Powerof Attorney for Health Care Act, more specifically Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 1337.13.153 The court's decision was quite surprising since the case was decided two months prior to the effective date of the statute, and Daniel had not executed a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care. Based upon section 1337.13(E), the court held that: (1) Daniel's death was not imminent; (2) withdrawal of the nutrition and hydration would result in death by malnutrition or dehydration; and (3) the public policy of Ohio, as determined by the General Assembly, opposed this type of action, regardless of the patient's or his surrogate's wishes." l Based upon this decision, at least in the Second Appellate District, patients will not enjoy their fundamental right to make health care decisions. Consequently, they will not be permitted to die with dignity. (E) An attorney in fact undera durable power of attorney for health care does not have authority to refuse or withdraw informed consent to the provision of nutrition or hydration to the principal, unless, prior to the refusal or withdrawal of that informed consent, all of the following apply:
(1) In the opinion of the principal's attending physician and at least one otherphysician, the provision of nutrition or hydration to the principal would not provide comfort to the principal;
(2) In the opinion of the principal's attending physician and at least one otherphysician, either of the following situations exists:
(a) The death of the principal is imminent whether or not nutrition or hydration is provided to the principal, the non provision of nutrition or hydration to the principal is not likely to result in the death of the principal by malnutrition or dehydration; (b) If nutrition or hydration were provided to the principal, the nutrition or hydration either could not be assimilated or would shorten the life of the principal; (3) The principal's attending physician and the other physicians involved enter their opinions as described in divisions (E)(1) and (2) The main difference between the living will and a durable power of attorney for health care is that through a living will, the patient articulates his own directives; conversely, through a durable power of attorney for health care, the patient merely appoints an agent to make medical decisions for him. Because the agent may not follow the principal's wishes, the principal may still be denied his fundamental right to decide. A living will statute and durable power of attorney for health care statute that work together to protect the patient under all circumstances would be the ideal solution. Alternatively, a combined act that contains a living will section and a section for appointment of proxy or surrogate would be helpful. 57 The Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act was narrowly drafted and is very restrictive. Some of the major areas of concern are as follows: Section 1337.11 (I) defines "terminal condition" as "any illness or injury that is likely to result in imminent death, regardless of the type, nature, and amount of health care that is provided."' ' 8 The term "imminent" is not defined. Moreover, the Act apparently excludes anyone who is in a PVS. Section 1337.11 (E) defines "hydration"' 5 9 and section 1337.11 (G) defines "nutrition."' ' 6 However, the definitions do not indicate whether they are considered to be part of "comfort care" (which also is not defined). If they are, then they cannot be withheld from the patient. Section 1337.13 delineates the agent's authority. Subsection (B) provides that the document is effective if the principal is in a terminal condition. Subsection (D) provides that if the principal is pregnant, care cannot be withdrawn or withheld unless the pregnancy or health care would pose a substantial risk to the life of the principal or unless two doctors certify that the fetus would not be born alive. Subsection (E) restricts the withholding of nutrition and hydration unless death is imminent and the cause of death will not be malnutrition ordehydration. The Couture 62 Court relied upon this subsection. Again, this subsection greatly restricts a PVS patient's and a pregnant woman's fundamental right to reject health care.
The statute also discusses requirements for revocation, 63 immunity for physicians and other persons,'"and transfer of patient to a willing facility. 65 Section 1337.17's last provision requires the use of a special printed form which must contain a lengthy, detailed, legalistic notice to the principal.
1 66 From the language of the statute, it appears that this notice must be printed on the form. This section also does not reveal whether a form executed by an individual in another state would be honored in Ohio.
See supra notes 25 to 32. The inability to deal with the issue of PVS patients, the restrictive time limit, the special form requirement, and the failure to consider patients who have not executed a durable power of attorney for health care all combine to make this statute very restrictive. If the Ohio courts will rely only upon this statute to make their decisions, potentially all PVS patients will end up like Daniel Couture.
PART IV: PROPOSED LIVING WILL STATUrE
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has drafted a proposed Uniform Rights of the Terminally III Act (1989).167 The American Bar Association has approved the statute for adoption by all the states.'" No states have adopted the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Il Act in its entirety. Rather, they have used it as a guideline for creating their own statutes. This is unfortunate. Realistically, probably no act could address every single issue in connection with a patient's right to make medical decisions. However, if the states had been willing to adopt the Uniform Act, at least all patients would be similarly treated.
Uniform Rights of the Terminally III Act (1989)
The best feature of this proposed legislation is its simplicity. Each section includes extensive explanatory comments. States should adopt not only the sections, but also the comments, to make their statutes as clear as possible.
Under the definitions, "terminal condition" is defined as "an incurable and irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment will, in the opinion of the attending physician, result in death within a relatively short time." (emphasis added) 1 6 9 This language has eliminated the problem of defining the term "imminent" which appears in most of the state statutes.
The Uniform Act does not require a specific form, but instead, offers a oneparagraph sample. 7° Two individuals must witness the declaration. However, the Uniform Act does not restrict the "identity" of qualified witnesses. 171 This relieves the patient from the chore of finding witnesses who qualify under some complicated set of rules. The Uniform Act also provides for appointment of a surrogate to make medical decisions for the patient. 72 Again, the form is optional, and the witnesses are not restricted. 
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The Uniform Act also considers a patient who has not executed a declaration concerning health care.
7 4 The Act provides the following hierarchy of persons who are entitled to make the decision for the patient:
(1) the spouse of the individual; (2) an adult child of the individual or, if there is more than one adult child, a majority of the adult children who are reasonably available for consultation; (3) the parents of the individual; (4) an adult sibling of the individual or, if there is more than one adult sibling, a majority of the adult siblings who are reasonably available for consultation; or (5) the nearest other adult relative of the individual by blood or adoption who -is reasonably available for consultation.""
The Uniform Act also imposes penalties upon doctors and other individuals who fail to follow the patient's directives. 76 Unfortunately, the penalties have been left blank for each state to establish. This failure to establish penalties could protect doctors from punishment for failing to follow the patient's wishes. Again, penalties should be imposed, even if only sanctions or charges of unprofessional conduct, to assure that the doctors will honor the directives.
Unfortunately, the Uniform Act implies that nutrition and hydration may be necessary for comfort care. 77 Moreover, the Act prohibits withdrawal from a pregnant patient if the fetus could develop to the point of live birth. 17 The comment to this section suggests that the withdrawal or withholding of nutrition and hydration should be decided on a case-by-case basis, but also suggests that the declarant can issue specific directions in the declaration. 9 The declaration should include a section wherein the patient can check whether he wants this type of treatment withheld or withdrawn. The previous version of the Act provided, "[u] nless the declaration provides otherwise," life-sustaining treatment could not be withheld from a pregnant woman. 80 The comment suggests that states may follow the earlier version, thus giving pregnant women the same rights as other patients in their health care decisions.'
Even with these few drawbacks, the Uniform Act is far superior to many of the state statutes which are presently in force. It is unfortunate that the states have failed to recognize and adopt the Uniform Act, thus ensuring equal treatment to patients in every state.
Senate Bill 1
The proposed statute that passed the Ohio Senate on February 5, 1991, combines a living will statute with Ohio's DPA/HC statute. The act contains many of the Uniform Act's best features.
The proposed act defines "terminal condition" as "a condition caused by disease, illness, or injury from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined by a principal's attending physician and one other physician who has examined the principal, both of the following apply:
(1) there can be no recovery, (2) there is a permanently unconscious state, or death is likely to occur within a relatively short time if life-sustaining treatment is not administered. "8 2
By adopting the "relatively short time" standard, Ohio will not need to judicially define the term "imminent."
By amending Ohio Rev. Code section 1337.12(A)(3), the legislature has removed the seven-year time limit.' 5 ' The proposed amendments to section 1337.12(B) simplify the execution requirements by allowing any adult who is not related to the principal, who is not the attorney-in-fact named in the instrument, and who is not the attending physician to serve as a witness. 1 84 Section 1337.13(E) forbids the attorney-in-fact to withdraw nutrition or hydration unless the principal is in a terminal condition and has authorized the attorney-in-fact to withdraw such support.' 85 This authorization must appear in the declaration in capital letters and must be initialed by the principal. (1991) . "A durable power of attorney for health care shall not expire unless the principal specifies an expiration date in the instrument. '" Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) . Any person who is related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption, any person whois designated as the attorney-in-fact in the instrument, and any attending physician are ineligible to be witnesses. Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 8 http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
Unfortunately, the legislature's proposed amendments to Ohio Rev. Code section 1337.13(D) provide that health care cannot be withheld or withdrawn from a pregnant patient unless such care would pose a substantial risk to the principal's life, or the fetus would not be born alive. 8 The legislature has also failed to enumerate penalties for doctors who ignore the patient's directives. It has also retained the complicated instructions to the patient. 8 S.B. 1 provides for the enactment of new section 2133.01, which will become the Modified Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. 8 9 Section 2133.02(A)(1) allows the patient to request that nutrition or hydration be withheld or withdrawn if the patient checks the appropriate box.' 90 Thus, the legislature is allowing the patient, not the doctor,to make this choice. Section 2133.05(A)(2)(a)(ii) provides the following hierarchy of persons who can decide for the patient if he has not executed either a living will or a durable power of attorney for health care: a) declarant's guardian, if any; b) declarant's spouse; c) an adult child of the declarant or, if there is more than one adult child, a majority of the declarant's adult children who are available within a reasonable period of time for consultation with the declarant's attending physician; d) the declarant's parents; e) an adult sibling of the declarant or, if there is more than one adult sibling, a majority of the declarant's adult siblings who are available within a reasonable period of time for consultation with the declarant's attending physician; or f) the nearest adult who is not described in the previously described priority classes of individuals, who is related to the declarant by blood or adoption, and who is available within a reasonable period of time for consultation with the declarant's attending physician.
Section 2133.06(C) includes the same restrictions for pregnant women as the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care AcL Sub. S.B. 1 imposes no penalties upon physicians who fail to follow directives.' 9 ' However, even with these limitations, the proposed legislation's strengths far outweigh its weaknesses. 
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Finally, the last section of Sub. S.B. 1 notes that S.B. 13 (Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act) was not intended to affect the ability of competent adults or guardians to make "informed health care decisions for themselves or their wards." 92 This statement corrects the Couture court's erroneous interpretation of that statute and insures that courts will not repeat the Couture mistake.
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CONCLUSION
The legal profession must keep pace with medical technology in order to protect the rights of individuals. There are as many as 10,000 patients across the country lying in persistent vegetative states being kept "alive" by artificial means. 94 The oldest of these patients is purported to be Rita Green, who has been unconscious since 1951.195 The right to die has become the abortion issue of the 1990's. There are dedicated, active, and sometimes militant groups on both sides of the issue.
Many polls indicate that Americans believe that they should be allowed to make their own health care decisions.1
96
Only comprehensive legislation can guarantee an individual's right to control his health care.
As can be seen from this Comment, the states have boldly attempted to implement legislation that will allow persons to make their own health care decisions. However, many of these statutes are very narrow and create serious problems. This patchwork method should not continue. The American Bar Association and the American Medical Association should jointly attempt to persuade all states to adopt the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. It is the best solution to the present problem. Even though the Act permits minordiscrepancies among the states, they are not so broad and sweeping as to deny most patients the right to die with dignity. . The Committee will also discuss the case law in this area at the same meeting. The testimony on these bills has been adjourned twice; and, as of March 28, 1991, the bill is still in Committee. Perhaps the Legislature will finally pass a comprehensive version of a living will bill, such as Sub. S.B. I appears to be. These individuals also must be provided for, and the states must enact legislation that guarantees to everyone the right to die in a dignified manner.
"I
POST SCRIP
Five months after Sub. S. B. 1 passed the Senate, the State of Ohio finally joined the ranks of other states that grant patients the "right to die."' 9 Although Am. Sub. S. B. 1 underwent fourteen amendments while in committee, the basic framework remained unchanged. 98 This Post Script identifies the significant changes to Am. Sub. S. B. 1.
In Am. Sub. S. B. 1, the legislature opted to distinguish between a patient who is in a"permanently unconscious state"1 99 and one who is in a "terminal condition. ' '2 00
Even though "permanently unconscious state" is no longer synonymous with "terminal condition," the statute applies to patients in either condition. Although this change appears insignificant, it may have far reaching repercussions as discussed below.
Another seemingly minor change involves who may make health care decisions fora patient. Under section 2133.05(A)(2)(a)(ii), the legislature removed the catch-all category of "any person related by blood or adoption" from the hierarchy of classes of persons capable of making health care decisions for the "Permanently unconscious state" means a state of permanent unconsciousness in a principal that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined in accordance with reasonable medical standards by the principal's attending physician and one other physician who has examined the principal, is characterized by both of the following:
(1) The principal is irreversibly unaware of himself and his environment.
(2) There is a total loss of cerebral cortical functioning, resulting in the principal having no capacity to experience pain or suffering. '00Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 1337.11(Y) provides: "Terminal condition" means an irreversible, incurable, and untreatable condition caused by disease, illness, or injury from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined in accordance with reasonable medical standards by a principal's attending physician and one other physician who has examined the principal, both of the following apply:
(1) There can be no recovery.
A TME To LiVE Spring, 19911 patient."' By removing the remote class of any relative, a patient who is not survived by an individual from one of the named classes may not be afforded the same rights under this section as the patient would have had under Sen. Montgomery's version of the bill. Even though the Probate Court can appoint a guardian to make a decision for the patient, this procedure can be time consuming and expensive. There simply does not seem to be any valid reason why the legislature removed this class of persons from the hierarchy. Perhaps this class will be reinstated as the courts test this law.
The legislature substantially changed the provision for pregnant patients under the Living Will section. 202 Under the revised section, treatment can only be withheld from a pregnant patient if two physicians determine that the fetus will not be born alive. 203 This section no longer considers whether the pregnancy is dangerous to the patient. In the Living Will section, the legislature eliminated the balancing which takes place under the Durable Power of Attorney section. 2 0 Under the Durable Power of Attorney section, the legislature has recognized that the life of the patient is paramount. 20 5 Nevertheless, the legislature has failed to afford pregnant patients comparable dignity and rights under the Living Will section. This distinction may form the basis for much litigation in the future as the husbands and families of pregnant patients challenge this inequity.
The most significant change in Am. Sub. S. B. 1 appears in the addition of the No Document section.20 6 This section allows the life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn or withheld from a patient who has not executed or has improperly executed a declaration. 2 7 In order to invoke this section, the patient must either be in a terminal condition or have been in a permanently unconscious state for the preceding twelve months. 2t The legislature set forth a hierarchy of persons who can consent to withholding or withdrawing treatment: 1) patient's guardian, if any; 
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Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991] , Iss. 3, Art. 8 http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8 2) patient's spouse; 3) adult child(ren) or a majority thereof; 4) patient's parents; 5) adult sibling(s) or a majority thereof; or 6) nearest adult who is related to the patient by blood or adoption.
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This section may only be activated if the court is satisfied that one of two conditions are met. First, the court must be presented with sufficient evidence demonstrating that the patient had previously expressed his wishes concerning the continuation or withholding of life-sustaining treatment in the event the patient became unable to make an informed decision. 210 In the alternative, the section would become effective if the decision concerning life-sustaining treatment "is consistent with the type of informed consent decision that the patient would have made if he previously had expressed his intention... ."211 This decision can be "inferred from the lifestyle and character of the patient, and from any other evidence of the desires of the patient, prior to his becoming no longer able to make informed decisions regarding the administration of life-sustaining treatment.
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The No Document section also contains a provision consistent with the Living Will section 2 3 regarding pregnant patients .
21
Treatment will only be withheld or withdrawn from a pregnant patient if two doctors agree that the fetus would not be born alive. 215 Again, the court will not take into consideration the wishes of the husband or family of the patient; the welfare of the fetus is paramount.
The legislature added specific conditions under which nutrition and hydration may be withdrawn from patients who have been in a permanently unconscious state for the preceding twelve months. 216 Nutrition and hydration can only be withdrawn if one of the following conditions are satisfied: 1) written consent is given by appropriate individuals; 2) the Probate Court has not reversed the consent; 3) two doctors determine that nutrition or hydration will not provide comfort or alleviate pain; 4) written consent is witnessed by two individuals and given to the doctor, 5) the informed consent would have been given by the patient if he were competent to make it; or The legislature also added a provision which formally recognizes that a validly executed document from another state is valid in Ohio. 2 1 Undersection 2133.14(A), declarations executed anywhere prior to the effective date of this statute 2 1 9 will be given effect as if they had been executed after the effective date of the statute. 220 If the declaration does not contain the requisite language that the patient desires that nutrition orhydration be withdrawn or withheld, the attending physician must apply to the Probate Court for an order authorizing this treatment. 22 ' While the legislature has honorably chosen to recognize both out-of-state declarations and improperly executed declarations, the legislature has unfortunately placed an additional burden on the families of these patients to obtain a court order before treatment can be terminated. The actual hearing under this section can take place "no sooner than the thirtieth business day, and no later than the sixtieth business day" after the necessary parties have received formal notice from the Probate Court.
2 22 Requiring families to wait an additional thirty to sixty days may unnecessarily inflict undue financial and emotional burdens.
Lastly, the new statute provides for an extensive appeal process under all three sections: the Durable Power of Attorney; Living Will; and No Document. Under the Durable Power of Attorney section, only persons in the two highest classes of the hierarchy can appeal the decision. 223 The individuals appealing the decision must notify the physician within two days and file their appeal within two business days thereafter. 22 The Probate Court must then serve notice on all interested parties within three days and hold a hearing within three business days thereafter.
2 25 The statute requires the Probate Court to make an immediate decision.
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The legislature also enumerated the grounds for appeal of the Probate Court's decision under the Durable Power of Attorney section: a) the principal has not lost capacity to decide for himself; 
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The burden of proof rests with the party objecting to the medical decision. The objecting party must present clear and convincing evidence if the Probate Court's decision concerns the use or continuance of life-sustaining treatment.
228 If the party's objection concerns the decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, then the opposing party must prove the grounds for objection by a preponderance of the evidence.1 29 Thus, the declarant's wishes carry a greater weight, and the party who seeks to overturn the declarant's wishes bears the heavier burden.
The Living Will section utilizes the same appellate process as in the Durable Power of Attorney section. 230 The legislature enumerated the following grounds for appeal: a) thedeclarantis notin a terminalcondition or in a permanently unconscious state; b) the declarant is able to make an informed decision; c) there is a reasonable possibility that the declarant will regain the capacity to make informed decisions; d) the course of action proposed to be undertaken is not authorized by the declarant's declaration; e) the declarant was not of sound mind or was under duress, fraud, or undue influence; f) the declaration does not comply with the statute. A TME To LrvE
b) there is a possibility that the principal will regain his capacity; c) the decision is inconsistent with the desires of the principal or not in his best interests; d) the document is no longer effective; e) the doctors' determination that the patient is terminal or in a permanently unconscious state is inaccurate; f) the decision pertaining to the use, or continuation, or the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is not authorized by the document; g) the principal was not of sound mind or was under or subject to duress, fraud, or undue influence; h) the document does not substantially comply with the statute. The legislature placed the fewest restrictions on the potential appellants under the No Document section. 2 3 5 Under this section, any member of the classes named in the hierarchy can appeal the decision. 236 The same appellate procedure and burdens of proof apply as under the Durable Power of Attorney and Living Will sections.
7
The elected officials worked over ten years to pass this legislation. The Ohio statute comports with the Federal Patient Self-Determination Act which goes into effect on December 1, 1991. Unfortunately, Am. Sub. S. B. 1 appears to be a compromise. Sen. Montgomery's original bill was a strong and equitable proposal for the citizens of Ohio. The amended bill allows egregious situations to occur. The amended bill places the life of the fetus paramount to that of the patient and forces a patient who has not executed documents to remain in a permanent unconscious state for at least twelve months before treatment can be terminated. These restrictions will probably form the basis of much litigation over the next few years.
Despite these major defects, this legislation is far superior to the former Durable Power of Attorney statute. After October 10, 1991, a majority of the individuals who have executed a Durable Power of Attorney or Living Will document, as well as loved ones of those who have not, will be able to make their own health care decisions. Their voices will be heard and their wishes will be followed. At last, in Ohio, at least some patients will be allowed to die with dignity. 
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Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 8 http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8 (1) "Attending physician" means the physician who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient.
(2) "Declaration" means a writing executed in accordance with the requirements of Section 2(a).
(3) "Health-care provider" means a person who is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized by the law of this State to administer health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a profession.
(4) "Life-sustaining treatment" means any medical procedure or intervention that, when administered to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong the process of dying.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(6) "Physician" means an individual [licensed to practice medicine in this State].
(7) "Qualified patient" means a patient [181 or more years of age who has executed a declaration and who has been determined by the attending physician to be in a terminal condition.
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(9) "Terminal condition" means an incurable and irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinioV of the attending physician, result in death within a relatively short time.
COMMENT
The Act's definitions of "life-sustaining treatment" and "terminal condition" are interdependent and must be read together. This has caused drafting problems in many existing acts. and the Act has been drafted to avoid the problems detected in existing legislation.
Most of the "life-sustaining treatment" and "terminal condition" definitions in existing statutes were considered problematical in that they (1) were tautological. defining "terminal condition" with respect to "life-sustaining treatment" and vice versa, and (2) defined terminal condition as requiring "imminent" death "whether or not" or "regardless of" the application of life-sustaining treatment. Strictly speaking, if death is "imminent" even with the full application of life-sustaining treatment, there is little point in having a statute permitting withdrawal of such procedures. The Act's definitions have attempted to avoid these problems.
The "life-sustaining treatment" definition found in many statutes inserts the clause "and when. in the judgment of the attending physician, death will occur whether or not such procedure or intervention is utilized," after the phrase "will serve only to prolong the dying process" found in the Act's provision. Because the Act's life-sustaining treatment definition concerns only those procedures or interventions applied to "qualified patients" (i.e., those who have been determined to be in a terminal condition), and because a terminal condition is defined as "incurable and irreversible" with death resulting "in a relatively short time." the requirement that death be "inevitable" has been satisfied by the presence of "qualified patient" in the life-sustaining treatment definition. Therefore. this additional clause was excluded because it was considered repetitious and possibly confusing.
The Act defines "life-sustaining treatment" in an all-inclusive manner, dealing with those procedures necessary for comfort care or alleviation of pain separately in Section 61b). where it is provided that such procedures need not be withdrawn or withheld pursuant to a declaration. Most existing statutes incorporate "comfort care" as an exclusion from the definition of life-sustaining treatment. Because many such procedures are life-sustaining, however, the Act avoids definitional confusion by treating them in a separate provision that reflects the Act's policy more clearly, and better reflects the fact that comfort care does not involve a fixed group 
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of procedures applicable in all instances.
Subsection (9) of Section 1 is the "terminal condition" definition. The difficulty of trying to express such a condition in precise, accurate, but not unduly restricting language is obvious. A definition must preserve the physicians' professional discretion in making such determinations. Consequently, the Act's definition of terminal condition incorporates not only selected language from various state acts, but also suggestions from medical literature in the field.
The Act employs the term "terminal condition" rather than terminal illness, and it is important that these two different concepts be distinguished. Terminal illness, as generally understood, is both broader and narrower than terminal condition. Terminal illness connotes a disease process that will lead to death; "terminal condition" is not limited to disease. "Terminal illness" also connotes an inevitable process leading to death, but does not contain limitations as to the time period prior to death, or potential for nonreversibility. as does "terminal condition."
The terminal condition definition requires that the condition be "incurable and irreversible." These adjectives were chosen over the similar phrase, "no possibility of recovery," because of possible ambiguity in the term "recovery" (i.e., recovery to "normal" or to some other stage). A number of state statutes now use "incurable" and/or "irreversible." and the terms appear to comport with the criteria applied by physicians in terminal care situations. The phrase "incurable and irreversible" is to be read conjunctively as long as the circumstances warrant. A condition which is reversible but incurable is not a terminal condition. Subsection (9) also requires that the condition result in the death of the patient with a "relatively short time ... without the administration of life-sustaining treatment." This requirement differs to some degree from the language employed in most of the statutes. First. the decision that death will occur in a relatively short time is to be made without considering the possibilities of extending life with lifesustaining treatment. The alternative is that required by a number of states-that death be imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are applied. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Research has noted that such a definition severely limits the group of terminally-ill patients able to qualify under these acts. It is precisely because life can be prolonged indefinitely by new medical technology that these acts have come into existence. Though the Act intends to err on the side -of prolonging life, it should not be made wholly ineffective as to the actual situation it purports to address. The provisions which require that death be imminent regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures appear to have that effect. Therefore, such provisions have been excluded in the Act.
The terminal condition definition of subsection 19) requires that death result "in a relatively short time." Rejecting the "imminency" language employed in a number of statutes, this alternative was chosen because it provides needed flexibility and reflects the balancing character of the time frame judgment. Though the phrase. "relatively short time," does not eliminate the need for judgment, it focuses the physician's medical judgment and avoids the narrowing implications of the word "imminent."
The "relatively short time" formulation is employed to avoid both the unduly constricting meaning of "imminent" and the artificiality of another alternative-fixed time periods, such as six months, one year. or the like. The circumstances and inevitable variations in disorder and diagnosis make unrealistic a fixed time period. Physicians may be hesitant to make predictions under a fixed time period standard unless the standard of physician judgment is so loose as to be unenforceable. Under the Act's standard, considerations such as the strength of the diagnosis, the type of disorder, and the like can be reflected in the judgment that death will result within a relatively short time. as they are now reflected in judgments physicians must and do make.
The life-sustaining treatment and terminal condition definitions exclude certain types of disorders, such as kidney disease requiring dialysis, and diabetes requiring continued use of insulin. This is accomplished in the requirement that terminal conditions be "irreversible," and that life-sustaining procedures serve "only to prolong the dying process." For purposes of the Act, diabetes treatable with insulin is "reversible," a diabetic person so treatable is not in the "dying process," and insulin is a treatment the benefits of which foreclose it serving .only" to prolong the dying process.
Section 2. Declaration Relating to Use of Life-Sustaining Treatment.
(a) An individual of sound mind and 1 18J or more years of age may execute at any time a declaration governing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. The DECLARATION If I should have an incurable and irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of my attending physician, cause my death within a relatively short time, and I am no longer able to make decisions regarding my medical treatment, I appoint or, if he or she is not reasonably available or is unwilling to serve. ,, to make decisions on my behalf regarding withholding or withdrawal of treatment that only prolongs the process of dying and is not necessary for my comfort or to alleviate pain, pursuant to the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of this State.
[If the individual(s) I have so appointed is not reasonably available or is unwilling to serve, I direct my attending physician, pursuant to the Uniform Rights of the Trminally Ill Act of this State, to withhold or withdraw treatment that only prolongs the process of dying and is not necessary for my comfort or to alleviate pain.]
Strike out bracketed language if you do not desire it.
Signed this day of ,
Witness ft~laress
Name and address of designee. Name Address (d) The designation of an attorney-in-fact (pursuant to the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act or the Model Health-Care Consent Act], or the judicial appointment of an individual (guardian], who is authorized to make decisions regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, constitutes for purposes of this (Act] a declaration designating another individual to act for the declarant pursuant to subsection (a).
(e) A physician or other health-care provider who is furnished a copy of the declaration shall make it a part of the declarant's medical record and, if unwilling to comply with the declaration, promptly so advise the declarant and any individual designated to act for the declarant.
COMMENT
Section 2 sets out the minimal requirements regarding the making and execution of a valid declaration. "Sample" declaration forms are offered in this section. The forms are not mandatory, as some acts require; they "may. but need not, be" followed. The forms provided also are not as elaborate as others. The drafters rejected more detailed declarations for two reasons. First. the forms are to serve only as examples of a valid declaration. More elaborate forms may have erroneously implied that a declaration more simply constructed would not be legally sufficient. Second. the sample forms' simple structure and specific language attempt to provide notice of exactly what is to be effectuated through these documents to those persons desiring to execute a declaration and the physicians who are to honor it.
Sections 2(a) and (cI of the Act authorize an individual by a declaration to designate another person to make decisions governing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining care. The designated person must be an adult of sound mind, but no other restrictions are placed on the designation other than the requirements of form contained in Section 2(a). The designated person may be an attorney-infact who is so designated in the declaration or in another writing that conforms with the applicable requirements of each state for durable powers of attorney.
Section 2(c) provides a model form of declaration by which the designation of another decision-maker may be accomplished. The bracketed language in the Section 2(c) form of declaration is intended to allow a declarant two choices when designating another person to make treatment decisions. Frst, by striking the bracketed language, an individual may make an exclusive designation of another decision-maker, and if that person is not available to fulfill the responsibility, the declaration will have no effect. It is intended, in such an event, that the substituted decision-makers who are authorized to make treatment decisions in Section 7 will be able to exercise decision-making authority pursuant to the terms of Section 7. The execution of a declaration exclusively designating another person to make treatment decisions, in other words, should not itself be construed as an "expressed intention of the individual" not to have lifesustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn under Section 7(dL.
The second choice available in the Section 2(c) form of declaration would make the declaration directly effective by its terms in the event that the substituted decision-maker were unavailable. This would be accomplished by not striking the bracketed language.
Other than the requirement that designees be adults of sound mind. no limitation is placed in Section 2 on the person(s) who may be designated to make decisions about the withholding or withdrawal of treatment for the declarant. It is specifically anticipated, for example, that some people may choose to appoint their physician to make such decisions and. absent any ethical restrictions on such an appointment. Section 2 anticipates that the physician may act in the appointed capacity.
Persons may be appointed to make decisions for a declarant through a declaration in substantially the form contained in Section 2(c). through appointment of an attorney-in-fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney, or through a judicially appointed guardian. In all cases, the designee has full power to make the rle-§ 2 vant decisions called for in the Act, and functions as the agent of the declarant. No specific standards, other than good faith, apply to decisions of the designee. Designation of another to make decisions pursuant to a durable power of attorney or judicially-appointed guardianship is treated as a declaration under the Act, so that, for example, decisions of the designee "govern" treatment decisions by the physician, and a physician who is unwilling to abide by such decisions (if medically reasonable) must transfer the patient to the care of another physician.
Designation by a durable power of attorney or judicially-appointed guardianship must be based on a sufficiently specific reference to health care or terminal care treatment decisions, as required by state law governing such appointments, to trigger application of the Act. No specific formulation of the terms of appointment is required, however. If appointment for purposes of health-care decisions would be sufficient under state law to include withholding or withdrawal of treatment for a person in a terminal condition, that will suffice under the Act.
The Act's authorization for specific decisions does not in any way restrict authority that exists under state law. The Act is in this respect additive only. Thus, for example. if an attorneyin-fact would have the authority independent of this Act to authorize withdrawal of treatment for a person in a persistent vegetative state not covered by the terms of the Act, the Act's limitations would not circumscribe the attorney-in-fact's authority under other law.
In designating another person to make treatment decisions, it is assumed that a declarant will identify only a single decision-maker. In view of this assumption, Sections 2(a) and (c) permit designation of an individual, rather than individuals, as the problems associated with identifying, locating, and communicating with multiple decision-makers are substantial and the drafters did not want to encourage the practice.
The Act does not expressly prohibit multiple designees, however, and a declaration containing a multiple designation is not invalid under the Act. The absence of any provision permitting a majority of such designees to act in the case of a disagreement, however, means that the refusal of one member of a designee group to agree to direct the withholding or withdrawal of treatment will foreclose any action under the Act unless the declaration specifically provides otherwise. Because of the difficulties associated with multiple designees under the Act, declarants should be discouraged from the practice and, if such designations are made and any result other than the one stated above is desired, the declaration should so specify.
The Act's provisions governing witnesses to a declaration are simplified. Section 2 provides only that the declaration be signed by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses. The Act does not require witnesses to meet any specific qualifications for two primary reasons. First, the interest in simplicity mandates as uncomplicated a procedure as possible. It is intended that the Act present a viable alternative for those persons interested in participating in their medical treatment decisions in the event of a terminal condition.
Second. the absence of more elaborate witness requirements relieves physicians of the inappropriate and perhaps impossible burden of determining whether the legalities of the witness requirements have been met. Many physicians understandably and rightly would be hesitant to make such decisions and, therefore, the effectiveness of the declaration might be jeopardized. It should be noted, as well, that protection against abuse in these situations is provided by the criminal penalties in Section 10. The attending physicians and other healthcare professionals will be able, in most circumstances, to discuss the declaration with the patient and family and any suspicion of duress or wrongdoing can be discovered and handled by established hospital procedures.
Section 2(e) requires that a physician or health-care provider who is given a copy of the declaration record it in the declarant's medical records. This step is critical to the effectuation of the declaration, and the duty applies regardless of the time of receipt. If a copy of the same declaration is already in the record, its rerecording would not be necessary, but its receipt should be noted as evidence of its continued force. Section 21e) is not duplicative of Section 5 which requires recording the terms of the declaration (or the document itself, when available, in the event of telephonic communication to the physician by another physician. for example) at the time the physician makes a determination of terminal condition. It was deemed important that knowledge of the declaration and its continued force be specifically noted at this critical juncture.
Section 2(e) imposes a duty on the physician or other health-care provider to inform the declarant of his or her unwillingness to comply with the provisions of the declaration. This will provide notice to the declarant that certain terms may be deemed medically unreasonable ISection 11(f)), or that the declarant should decide whether to select another attending physician who is willing to carry out the Act (Section 8). § 3 , UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989) Section 3. When Declaration Operative. A declaration becomes operative when (i) it is communicated to the attending physician and (ii) the declarant is determined by the attending physician to be in a terminal condition and no longer able to make decisions regarding administration of life-sustaining treatment. When the declaration becomes operative, the attending physician and other health-care providers shall act in accordance with its provisions and with the instructions of a designee under Section 2(a) or comply with the transfer requirements of Section 8. COMMENT Section 3 establishes the preconditions to to relieve the physician from carrying out the the declaration becoming operative. Once oper. declaration except for any specific unreasonative, Section 3 provides that the attending able or unlawful request in the declaration. physician shall act in accordance with the pro-Transfer of the patient under Section 8 is to visions of the declaration or transfer care of the occur if the physician, for reasons of conscience, patient under Section 8. This provision is not for example, is unwilling to carry out the Act or intended to eliminate the physician's need to to follow medically reasonable requests in the evaluate particular requests in terms of reason-declaration. able medical practice under Section lIlIf) nor Section 4. Revocation of Declaration.
(a) A declarant may revoke a declaration at any time and in any manner, without regard to the declarant's mental or physical condition. A revocation is effective upon its communication to the attending physician or other health-care provider by the declarant or a witness to the revocation.
(b) The attending physician or other health-care provider shall make the revocation a part of the declarant's medical record.
Section 4 provides for revocation of a declaration and is modeled after North Carolina's similar provision. Virtually every other statute sets out specific examples of how a declaration can be revoked-by physical destruction, by a signed, dated writing, or by a verbal expression of revocation. A provision that freely allowed revocation and avoided procedural complications was desired. The simple language of Section 4 appears to meet these qualifications. It should be noted that the revocation is, of course, not effective until communicated to the attending physician or another health-care provider working under a physician's guidance. such as nursing facility or hospice staff. The Act. unlike many statutes, also does not explicitly require that a person relaying the revocation be acting on the declarant's behalf. Such a requirement could impose an unreasonable burden on the attending physician. The communication is assumed to be in good faith, and the physician may rely on it.
In employing a general revocation provision. it was intended to permit revocation by the broadest range of means. Therefore. for example. it is intended that a revocation can be effected in writing, orally, by physical defacement or destruction of a declaration, and by physician sign communicating intention to revoke.
Section 5. Recording Determination of Terminal Condition and Declaration. Upon determining that a declarant is in a terminal condition, the attending physician who knows of a declaration shall record the determination and the terms of the declaration in the declarant's medical record.
Section 5 of the Act requires that an attend-through oral communication between physiing physician record the determination that the cians. If the attending physician determines patient is in a terminal condition in the pa-that the patient is in a terminal condition, and tient's medical records. The section provides has been notified of the declaration, the physithat an attending physician must know of the cian is to make the determination of terminal declaration's existence. It is anticipated that condition, as defined in Section 1(8), part of the knowledge may in some instances occur patient's medical records. There is no explicit The physician must record the terms of the declaration in the medical record so that its specific language or any special provisions are known at later stages of treatment. It is assumed that "terms" of the declaration will be a copy of the declaration itself in most instances, although cases of an emergency character may arise, for example, in which the contents of a declaration can be reliably conveyed, and where obtaining a copy of the declaration prior to making decisions governed by it will be impracticable. In such cases, the terms of the declaration will suffice for recording purposes under Section 5.
Section 6. Treatment of Qualified Patients.
(a) A qualified patient may make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment so long as the patient is able to do so.
(b) This [Act] does not affect the responsibility of the attending physician or other health-care provider to provide treatment, including nutrition and hydration, for a patient's comfort care or alleviation of pain.
(c) Life-sustaining treatment must not be withheld or withdrawn pursuant to a declaration from an individual known to the attending physician to be pregnant so long as it is probable that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining treatment.
Section 6(a) recognizes the right of patients who have made a declaration and are determined to be in a terminal condition to make decisions regarding use of life-sustaining procedures. Until unable to do so. such patients have the right to make such decisions independently of the terms of the declaration. In affording patients a "right to make decisions regarding use of life-sustaining procedures," the Act is intended to reflect existing law pertaining to this issue. As Sections 11(e) and (f) indicate, qualifications on a patient's right to force the carrying out of those decisions in a manner contrary to law or accepted standards of medical practice, for example, are not intended to be overridden.
In Section 6(b) the Act uses the term "comfort care" in defining procedures that may be applied notwithstanding a declaration instructing withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment. The purpose for permitting continuation of life-sustaining treatment deemed necessary for comfort care or alleviation of pain is to allow the physician to take appropriate steps to insure corpfort and freedom from pain, as dictated by reasonable medical standards. Many existing statutes employ the term "comfort care" in connection with the alleviation of pain. and the Act follows this example. Although the phrase "to alleviate pain" arguably is subsumed within the term comfort care, the additional specificity was considered helpful for both the doctor and layperson.
Section 61b) does not set out a separate rule governing the provision of nutrition and hydration. Instead. each is subject to the same considerations of necessity for comfort care and alleviation of pain as are all other forms of life-sustaining treatment. If nutrition and hydration are not necessary for comfort care or alleviation of pain. they may be withdrawn. This approach was deemed preferable to the approach in a few existing statutes, which treat nutrition and hydration as comfort care in all cases, regardless of circumstances, and exclude comfort care from the life-sustaining treatment definition.
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Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 8 http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8 professionals perceive the providing of nourishment through intravenous feeding apparatus or nasogastric tubes as comfort care in all cases or whether such procedures at times merely prolong the dying process. Whether procedures to provide nourishment should be considered life-sustaining treatment or comfort care appears to depend on the factual circumstances of each case and, therefore, such decisions should be left to the physician, exercising reasonable medical judgment. Declarants may, however, specifically express their views regarding continuation or noncontinuation of such procedures in the declaration, and those views will control. Section 61c) addresses the problem of a qualified patient who is pregnant. The states which address this issue typically require that the declaration be given no force or effect during the pregnancy. Because this requirement inadvertently may do more harm than good to the fetus, Section 6(c) provides a more suitable, if more complicated, standard. It is possible to hypothesize a situation in which life-sustaining treatment, such as medication. may prove fatal to a fetus which is at or near the point of viability outside the womb. In such cases, the Act's provision would permit the life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn or withheld as appropriate in order best to assure survival of the fetus. Also, for example, if the qualified patient is only a few weeks pregnant and the physician, pursuant to reasonable medical judgment, determines that it is not probable that the fetus could develop to a point of viability outside the womb even with application of life-sustaining treatment, such treatment may also be withheld or withdrawn. Thus, the pregnancy provision attempts to honor the terminally-ill patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment without jeopardizing the likelihood of life for the fetus.
In the original Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, adopted by the Conference in 1985, Section 6(c) included the introductory phrase "Unless the declaration otherwise provides." In the current Act the phrase has been eliminated from Section 6(c) in order to conform with a similar provision in Section 7. Under the current provision, life-sustaining treatment may not be withdrawn from a woman known to be pregnant if it is probable that the fetus will develop to live birth with continuation of the treatment, notwithstanding expressed views of the patient to the contrary. In view of the requirement that development to birth be proba-. ble, and the frequently complicating impact of prolonged life-sustaining treatment for a terminal patient, the provision is likely to have an impact in relatively narrow circumstances.
Nevertheless, in states that wish to accommodate the declaration of a pregnant woman, the wording from the prior version of the Act may be used. Differences from the Uniform Act in this specific application would not undermine the interest in uniformity served by the Act. Section 7. Consent by Others to Withdrawal or Withholding of Treatment.
(a) If written consent to the withholding or withdrawal of the treatment, witnessed by two individuals, is given to the attending physician, the attending physician may withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an individual who:
(1) has been determined by the attending physician to be in a terminal condition and no longer able to make decisions regarding administration of life-sustaining treatment; and (2) has no effective declaration. (b) The authority to consent or to withhold consent under subsection (a) may be exercised by the following individuals, in order of priority:
(1) the spouse of the individual; (2) an adult child of the individual or, if there is more than one adult child, a majority of the adult children who are reasonably available for consultation; (3) the parents of the individual; (4) an adult sibling of the individual or, if there is more than one adult sibling, a majority of the adult siblings who are reasonably available for consultation; or (5) the nearest other adult relative of the individual by blood or adoption who is reasonably available for consultation.
(c) If a class entitled to decide whether to consent is not reasonably available for consultation and competent to decide, or declines to decide, the next class is authorized to § 6 Spring, 1991) (e) A decision of the attending physician acting in good faith that a consent is valid or invalid is conclusive.
(f) Life-sustaining treatment must not be withheld or withdrawn pursuant to this section from an individual known to the attending physician to be pregnant so long as it is probable that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining treatment.
Section 7 provides a procedure by which an attending physician may obtain consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in the absence of an effective declaration. It draws upon the definitions of the Act, as well as those sections bearing on the process for and the legal effect of withholding or withdrawal of treatment, but in most other respects it is free-standing. It can therefore simply be inserted as a new section in existing statutes that follow the original 1985 Uniform Act. For states that might want to adopt the Section 2 amendments. but not the Section 7 amendments. Section 7 can simply be deleted.
The purpose of Section 7 is to authorize persons other than the patient who are in a close familial relationship to the patient to consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment when the patient has no prior declaration, or when a prior declaration is not effective. Prior declarations might not be effective for a variety of reasons, including for example the expiration of a time limit, the failure to have the declaration properly witnessed, or the absence of a condition precedent contained in the declaration, such as the death or disability of a designated decision-maker.
Section 7 authorizes binding consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for qualified patients. Members of the patient's family in designated priority order may consent to withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, and such consent will be treated as if the individual had given it. Consent by the designated family members. however, must be given in good faith, and is not valid if it would conflict with the expressed intention of the patient.
The consent provision of Section 7 differs from the designation of another to make decisions under Section 2. Because the "consent" does not constitute a declaration under the Act. provisions that impose an obligation on the physician to seek out a designee under a declaration, that make the designee's decisions "govern" treatment, and that require transfer by a physician under Section 8, do not apply. Section 7. in short, is not a full alternative to a declaration, but is rather a means by which the attending physician can obtain legally reliable consent to the withholding or withdrawal of treatment for individuals in a terminal condition. should that be needed in the circumstances. Section 7 neither constitutes a de jure appointment of family to make such decisions in all cases, nor does it limit treatment authority authorized under other law.
Section 8. Transfer of Patients. An attending physician or other health-care provider who is unwilling to comply with this [Act] shall take all reasonable steps as promptly as practicable to transfer care of the declarant to another physician or health-care provider who is willing to do so.
Section 8 is designed to address situations in victions or policies unrelated to medical judgwhich a physician or health-care provider is ment called for under the Act. In such inunwilling to make and record a determination stances, the physician or health-care provider of terminal condition, or to respect the medi. must promptly take all reasonable steps to cally reasonable decisions of the patient or des-transfer the patient to another physician or ignee regarding withholding or withdrawal of health-care provider who will comply with the life-sustaining procedures, due to personal con-applicable provisions of the Act.
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